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WELCOME HOME RAMBO:
HIGH-MINDED ETHICS AND LOW-DOWN
TACTICS IN THE COURTS
Gideon Kanner*
I. INTRODUCTION
One-man army John Rambo,1 having dispatched a brutish sheriff's
posse, mauled the North Vietnamese army, and mangled the minions of
the Evil Empire in Afghanistan, is looking for new worlds to conquer.
Where? In the courtrooms of America, of course. "Rambo litigation"
has become the au courant topic among lawyers and judges who report
with alarm that deception, nastiness, intimidation and general lack of
civility among lawyers are permeating the litigation process.2
* B.M.E., The Cooper Union; J.D., University of Southern California. Professor of
Law, Emeritus, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Of counsel, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May.
Past president, California Academy of Appellate Lawyers.
1. DAVID MORRELL, FIRsT BLOOD (1972).
2. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CmLITy IN THE SEVENTH FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 6-7 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]; Arthur Gilbert, Civility:
It's Worth the Effort, TRIAL, Apr. 1991, at 106, 108 (commenting on rising incivility among
judges) (author is associate justice of California Court of Appeal); Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo
Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637-38
(1990) (author is federal judge on Fifth Circuit) [hereinafter Reavley, Rambo Litigators]; see
also David A. Kaplan & Ginny Carroll, How's Your Lawyer's Left Jab?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26,
1990, at 70, 70:
Bad-boy lawyers file fribbling motions, spill brewed decaf on transcripts, arrive 20
minutes late for all meetings and harass opposing counsel with volumes of paper on
Christmas Eve. They obfuscate, they procrastinate, they infuriate-all in the name
of zealous advocacy. They behave so badly that a federal judge in Oklahoma in a
recent order wishfully consigned two lawyers to hell. To detractors, the business
cards of these foul practitioners could just as well read 'Rambo, Esq.'
Id.; Brian N. Mitchell, Stop Litigation Terrorism, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1991, at 120, 120 ("Litiga-
tion terrorists are threatening our legal system."). Compare William A. Brewer III & Francis
B. Majorie, One Year After Dondi: Time to Get Back to Litigating?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 833
(1990) (suggesting inappropriateness of curbing "Rambo" tactics through judicial mandates of
courtesy) with Thomas M. Reavley, Response to "One Year After Dondi," 17 PEPP. L. REV.
851 (1990) (asserting that "courtesy and honesty" in litigation process "are both wise and
rewarding").
Honorable mention must go to David Margolick, the New York Times legal columnist
who, in reporting on the Interim Report observed that the judges "could have just paraphrased
Thomas Hobbes and said that lawyers are increasingly making the practice of law nasty, brut-
ish and long." David Margolick, At the Bar: Does 'Polite' Really Mean 'Wimpy'? Or, What
Has Happened to Civility in a Once-Noble Profession?, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1991, at B10.
It also seems appropriate at the outset to make a note on terminology and what it con-
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What in the world is going on? How could this happen? Aren't
"officers of the court" subject to preventive and corrective judicial ac-
tion? Are there no rules that prohibit this sort of stuff?3 In theory, yes;
in practice, no. Too often the rules are bent' or simply not enforced.
The sad fact is that too many judges simply do not care enough, or for
some reason are repelled by the concededly distasteful task of having to
police their courtrooms.' This Article's premise is that the problem of
ceals. In fairness to the fictional John Rambo, his vicious and deadly tactics were appropriate
to the life-or-death combat situations he was facing. Not so in litigation which supposedly
rises above trial by combat, and functions as a civilized "search for truth" infused with profes-
sionalism and subject to enforceable rules governing behavior of the participants. A friend has
aptly suggested that Mr. Rambo be given an honorable discharge, and that the term "Godzilla
litigation" be used instead. Terms such as "scorched earth" and "take-no-prisoners" litigation
are also used. Id.
3. As Brewer & Majorie correctly point out, a distinction must be drawn between "hard-
ball" litigation-a process of pushing one's case to judgment aggressively, but within the
rules-and misconduct that violates those rules. Brewer & Majorie, supra note 2, at 846 n.93.
This Article addresses the latter situation, although it follows that if judges will not enforce the
rules in cases of outright misconduct occurring in their courtrooms before their eyes, it should
not come as a surprise that they will not do much of anything about lapses from professional
civility, or about harassing tactics outside the courtroom, even though they can easily influence
those for the better.
4. The prevailing rule makes appellate review of claims of misconduct of counsel highly
fact dependent. Sabella v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Cal. 2d 311, 320-21, 449 P.2d 750, 755-56, 74
Cal. Rptr. 534, 539-40, cerL denied, 395 U.S. 909 (1969). This approach allows the courts
considerable leeway to indulge their result orientation, as demonstrated by Sabella itself.
In Sabella, the plaintiff was injured while working on the defendant's freight car. Id. at
313, 449 P.2d at 751, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 535. He sued, alleging negligence. Id. During the trial,
plaintiff's counsel attempted to elicit sympathy from the jury by repeatedly referring to the
defendant as "inhuman" and "heartless, .... cheapskates' attempting to ... deprive plaintiff of
his just due" and of "sending plaintiff 'down the tubes' and casting him on the 'human trash
pile.'" Id. at 317, 449 P.2d at 753, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 537. Defendant's counsel objected only
once to these references and never asked that the jury be admonished to disregard them. Id. at
319, 449 P.2d at 754, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 538. On appeal, defendant claimed, among other things,
that plaintiff's counsel's remarks constituted prejudicial misconduct. Id. at 317, 449 P.2d at
753, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 537. The court agreed, but held nevertheless, that the claim was not
entitled to consideration because defendant's counsel had failed to make a timely objection and
to request a jury admonition. Id. at 320, 449 P.2d at 754, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
5. See, eg., Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 391, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 190 (1964). Wolf
involved outrageous misconduct by trial counsel. Examples of trial counsel's "intentional,
blatant and continuous" misconduct included claiming that the manufacturer of a medication
was a "con outfit," that it had no "regard at all for humanity," that there were "reports of
people dying from [the medication]" from "all over the country," that the medication was "a
death dealing drug," that the manufacturer bribed the head of the Federal Drug Administra-
tion, and that the manufacturer misrepresented its profits from the sale of the medication. Id.
at 385-86, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87. Other misconduct involved abusing opposing counsel by
referring to him as "an idiot" and a "laughing hyena," characterizing his objections as "asi-
nine" and "hogwash," telling him to shut up, and accusing him of suborning peujury. Id. Yet,
in spite of all this, the trial judge failed to respond. The California Court of Appeal noted:
An able, highly respected, jurist of many years' experience and a well-earned reputa-
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lawyer misconduct is not new. It has been around for a long time, and
has grown in incidence and severity largely because of judges' tolerance,
and their unwillingness to interdict it effectively even when it occurs
before their eyes in their own courtrooms.6 This Article then suggests
that such judicial tolerance of the intolerable is a substantial factor which
lies at the root of the Rambo litigation phenomenon.7
II. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH-OR LACK THEREOF
An example of the misguided judicial approach to the problem is
offered by a recent article authored by Judge Thomas M. Reavley of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.8 Judge Reavley
offers the view that in cases of lawyer misconduct where both attorneys
have done something to contribute to "the difficulty," judges are not
likely to respond to either side's pleas to restore civility to the proceed-
ings.9 Why not? Shall we just let 'em. slug it out in the gutter, the brutes?
Why is that an acceptable approach to the problem? Even if the stake of
individual litigants in fair trials does not transcend their lawyers' quarrel
of the moment, Judge Reavley unfortunately does not appear to appreci-
ate fully the stake society has in keeping trials fair. Moreover, judges
also have a substantial interest in setting the tone and standards of behav-
ior in their own courtrooms.
And what if only one side engages in nasty behavior and victimizes
the other? Then, according to Judge Reavley, the faultless attorney "has
a much better chance of obtaining relief."10 Only a chance? Don't some
reliably enforceable rules control such situations? Not really.
The real relief, according to Judge Reavley, is for the victimized
lawyer to get his opponent's "episodes of unfairness into evidence" even
if they "come durng... trial," and to "list every statement... unsup-
ported by proof ... made by the opposing counsel."'" Then, "in the
course of final summation, the attorney should mention all of these state-
tion for courtroom control presided at this trial. Loss of such control [over the pro-
ceedings] in this case is unexplained and to us very puzzling. Excepting one mild
characterization of conduct by counsel at [sic] 'a little bit disgraceful' (made in such a
manner that a reader of the transcript is left uncertain at which attorney the criticism
was directed) and several expressions of disgust, such as, 'Let's all go home. What
do you say we all go home,' there was almost no effort to keep the proceedings within
the confines of propriety.
Id.
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; infra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
8. See Reavley, Rambo Litigators, supra note 2.
9. Id. at 653.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 653-54.
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ments, explaining that the opponent must have made them with the in-
tent to deceive the jurors."12 Judge Reavley, however, does not tell us
just what is to be done with such a list, how this "evidence" is to be put
on, when and by whom, what its relevance might be to the issues dividing
the litigants-as opposed to their lawyers' shenanigans-and how the
jury is to be instructed on its legal significance. Similarly, he does not say
why faultless lawyers unfairly subjected to misconduct by their adversa-
ries should have to waste their efforts and limited summation time dis-
secting and refuting their opponents' improper statements-which
should not have been made in the first place-rather than arguing the
merits of their own clients' cases. 13 Also, shouldn't the offending lawyer
have a right to rebut such evidence? If so, how? After all, even murder-
ers are entitled to due process; why not nasty lawyers?
In short, Judge Reavley's proposed cure may be worse than the dis-
ease. It substitutes a discussion of the "merits" of the improper and
often false assertions constituting the misconduct in place of the issues
that are properly before the court and jury-which is exactly what the
misbehaving lawyer wants.
All this sounds suspiciously like a fastidious expression of distaste
for policing the courtroom, if not a defacto abdication of judicial respon-
sibility. Judge Reavley appears to believe that, ultimately, virtue is its
own reward because, as he puts it, "[tiricks, pretense, and... unfairness
12. Id. at 654. This remarkable prescription fails to note that final summation is often the
misbehaving lawyer's favorite time to unleash improper, inflammatory, and just plain false
arguments to the jury. See, eg., infra note 13. It is unclear how Judge Reavley's prescription
would work in this context. Moreover, such a prescription would tend to transform final sum-
mation into a real lawyers' slanging match.
13. An example of the problem is provided by Garden Grove School District v. Hendler,
63 Cal. 2d 141, 403 P.2d 721, 45 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965). The principal issue in that eminent
domain case was the value of the condemned land-a matter that involves technical and, at
times, dreary testimony which taxes advocates' skills when the time comes to argue it to the
jury. Id. at 142, 403 P.2d at 722, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 314. Yet, in his jury argument, the con-
demnor's counsel launched a scurrilous personal attack on the condemnee. Id. at 143 & n.l,
403 P.2d at 722 & n.l, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 314 & n.1. Surely, requiring the victimized party's
attorney confronting such an outburst to disrupt the planned jury summation and spend his or
her precious argument time attempting to persuade the jury to disregard the improper asser-
tions would only play into the hands of the wrongdoer by diverting the jury's attention from
valuation issues to the litigants' personalities and the lawyers' behavior. Under such circum-
stances, the substantive cause of the victimized party is likely to suffer, as indeed it did in
Hendler. Hendler was reversed due to plaintiff's counsel's misconduct. Id. at 146, 403 P.2d at
724, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 316. Following reversal, the case was retried without misconduct; this
time, in place of the vacated $73,000 verdict, id. at 142, 403 P.2d at 722, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 314,
the jury came in with a $194,000 award. Telephone Interview with Jerrold A. Fadem, attor-
ney for defendants-appellants (Sept. 5, 1991).
[Vol. 25:81
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invite rejection." 14 Maybe. Then again, maybe not.'"
In the real world trickery and unfairness succeed all too often. 6
That is one reason why we have courts. In any event, such a genteel
vision of justice triumphant--even if justified, which it often is not-is
cold comfort to a client who has to spend a fortune on litigation, only to
be unjustly vilified or otherwise abused in the courtroom, and then be
forced to watch helplessly as the merits of his cause are obscured by an
unprofessional sideshow of lawyers pursuing irrelevant ad hominem
quarrels before an aloof judge. 7
14. Reavley, Rambo Litigators, supra note 2, at 655.
15. Consider, for example, the sad case of six-year old Heidi Rossi who was struck by a car
while crossing the street. Rossi v. Osborn, 2d Civ. No. 40100, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d
Dist., Apr. 27, 1973). In the ensuing trial for negligence-which naturally took place a consid-
erable time after the accident, at a time when Heidi's injuries had healed-the defense success-
fully moved for bifurcation, and obtained an in limine ruling that the nature and extent of the
injuries not be brought out by either side in the liability phase of the trial. Id. at 3. The
defense also displayed Heidi before the jury, although she was not called as a witness. Id.
With the stage thus set, and although this was a trial of liability only, defense counsel sug-
gested to the jury that Heidi's evident condition militated against recovery. Id. The jury, not
having heard any evidence of the injuries, returned a defense verdict. Id. at 1-2. The trial
judge later acknowledged that this ploy had been in bad faith but nevertheless denied a new
trial. Id. at 4-5. The court of appeal affirmed. Id. at 18. The California Supreme Court
denied hearing. Telephone Interview with Zaida Heraldez, Deputy Clerk for Court of Appeal,
Second District (Sept. 10, 1991).
Now, what was that about trickery inviting rejection?
16. See Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1972) (appraiser's report partially stripped before being produced in response to discovery,
and withheld matters sprung as surprise at trial, yet court found insufficient showing of preju-
dice because aggrieved party's lawyer did not object appropriately); Sabella v. Southern Pac.
Co., 70 Cal. 2d 311, 449 P.2d 750, 74 Cal. Rptr. 534, cert denied, 380 U.S. 109 (1969) (af-
firming trial court's judgments in spite of egregious misconduct of trial counsel); Horn v. Atch-
ison, T. & S.F. Ry., 61 Cal. 2d 602, 394 P.2d 561, 39 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1964), cert denied, 380
U.S. 909 (1965) (same); People v. Sunshine Canyon, Inc., 2d Civ. No. 36371 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d
Dist., Mar. 14, 1972) (facts similar to Nestle but lawyer objected appropriately, yet affirming
judgment because results not deemed sufficiently prejudicial).
17. Judge Reavley's detached approach to this problem overlooks one important point.
Where a litigant, or counsel, is subjected to personal invective but the judge either does noth-
ing or belittles the incident, as judges are wont to do, see, eg., supra note 5 and accompanying
text, jurors may surmise that these accusations must have some factual basis, or else surely the
judge would respond favorably to the protesting lawyer's objections. This occurs a fortiori
where the lawyer requests a jury admonition and the judge either refuses to grant it or grants it
only in a lukewarm or equivocal fashion. See, eg., infra note 40.
Such overly restrained judicial reaction is motivated by judges' desire to appear impartial,
and not to encourage juries to take cues from the severity of the judges' language. But even if
such punctiliously benign judicial motivation is assumed, serious courtroom misconduct
should leave no ethical person in doubt as to who is the "good guy" and who is the "bad guy."
To the extent a morally healthy, discernible judicial reaction has to redound to someone's
disadvantage, the case for letting the "good guy" suffer while protecting and de facto re-
warding the "bad guy" lacks any defensible moral foundation. Unfortunately, in an effort to
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What in the world is going on in our courts? Too much. But there
are rational, if not good, reasons for it. Lawyers are by and large neither
stupid nor irrational. They do what they think will help their cause and
put pressure on their opponents. But above all, they do what they think
judges will let them get away with. And these days, make no mistake,
judges are letting the bad guys get away with a lot.
See, for example, United States v. 320 Acres,'8 decided in Judge
Reavley's circuit. There, government lawyers, in a huge eminent domain
case, presented their arguments to a congenial district judge without no-
tice to scores of their pro se adversaries. 9 Then, when caught red-
handed, they refused to stipulate to vacating the resulting ex parte judg-
ments.2" True, those judgments were eventually vacated on appeal,2 ' but
why should an appeal have been necessary on such facts? What did the
trial judge think he was doing?2 2 Once the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit found misconduct of such dimension to be
present, did anyone get disciplined or sanctioned? Hardly. A stem tut-
tut was the extent of it.23 The opinion characterized the United States
Attorney's behavior as "contentious" and "intransigent,"'24 and that was
that. Not a word of criticism of the trial judge. In fact, the next federal
mass condemnation case to hit southern Florida was assigned to the
same district judge, who then conducted himself so as to be eventually
appear impartial to the jury, judges often do treat the transgressor and the victim alike, thereby
encouraging the former and de facto legitimizing the improper conduct in the jury's eyes.
18. 605 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979).
19. Id. at 777 n.22.
20. Ironically, as the balance of 320.Acres makes clear, that case raised important issues of
valuation law; it was no routine matter. See id. at 827.
21. Id. at 828.
22. Trial courts can display an astonishingly callous attitude when confronted with law-
yers' misconduct. See Hendler, 63 Cal. 2d at 143 n.1, 403 P.2d at 721 n.1, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 314
n.1 (trial judge made no effort to interdict plaintiff's counsel's prejudicial remarks and activi-
ties and overruled defendant's counsel's objections to them); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Morris, 266 Cal. App. 2d 616, 630-32, 72 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414-15 (1968) (trial judge first an-
nounced intent to strike misconduct-tainted testimony but after witness left stand and was no
longer subject to continuous cross-examination, judge vacated ruling and admitted testimony);
Sunshine Canyon, Ina, 2d Civ. No. 36371, slip op. at 15-18, 20, 29 (same); see also City of Los
Angeles v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 870-71, 558 P.2d 545, 551, 135 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (1977),
vacating sub nor. City of Los Angeles v. Hall, 55 Cal. App. 3d 854, 127 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976).
In Decker, the Deputy City Attorney falsely argued to the jury that there was an excess of
parking in the area so that the condemned property's highest and best use could not have been
for parking as contended by the condemnee. Id. at 864-67, 558 P.2d at 547-48, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 649-50. In fact, the city's environmental impact report showed a parking shortage in the
area. Id. Neither the trial court nor the court of appeal saw anything wrong with that argu-
ment. Id. at 870, 558 P.2d at 548, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
23. See 320 Acres, 605 F.2d at 778-80 n.22.
24. Id.
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recused by a writ of mandate issued by the court of appeals over the
spirited opposition of the government.25 And who had to bear the cost of
all that legal maneuvering? Here is a clue: it wasn't the bad guys.
III. DOUBLE DUTY FOR THE VICTIM OF MISCONDUCT IN
CALIFORNIA
In California, the prevailing rule is that a lawyer who engages in
misconduct in open court is home free, and need not do anything to cure
the resulting adverse effects-not even if the conduct is outrageous and
highly prejudicial.26 Rather, the victimized counsel-in order to pre-
serve the point on appeal-must go through an elaborate ceremony of
objecting27 to every instance of misconduct2" in the right way, 29 assigning
the improper remarks as misconduct, and requesting a jury admoni-
tion.30 An objection without more is insufficient.3" All of this ceremo-
nial rigmarole often tends to emphasize the improper statements for the
jury while it fails to "unring the bell."'32 Moreover, if the trial judge gives
the requested admonition,3 3 the misconduct is deemed cured, except in
25. United States v. 0.21 Acres, 803 F.2d 620, 622 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986). The 0.21 Acres
opinion fails to note that it took two writ petitions to obtain that result. Telephone Interview
with Toby Prince Brigham, attorney for defendants-appellants (Aug. 22, 1991).
26. Misconduct of trial counsel is entitled to no consideration on appeal, unless the record
shows timely and proper objection by adverse counsel, coupled with a request for jury admoni-
tion. Horn v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 61 Cal. 2d 602, 610, 394 P.2d 561, 565, 39 Cal. Rptr.
721, 725 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 909 (1965).
27. Id.
28. Sabella v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Cal. 2d 311, 319, 449 P.2d 750, 754, 74 Cal. Rptr.
534, 538, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
29. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 929-30, 496 P.2d 480, 486-87, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 574-75 (1972).
30. See, eg., Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 320, 449 P.2d at 755, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 539; Horn, 61
Cal. 2d at 610, 394 P.2d at 565, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
31. See Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 320, 449 P.2d at 755, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
32. Simmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 341, 356, 133 Cal. Rptr. 42,
50 (1976) (citing Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 392, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 191 (1964)).
Note, however, that another California Court of Appeal asserted that it is "bromidic to say
that one cannot unring a bell." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Morris, 266 Cal. App. 2d 616,
638, 72 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419 (1968). This assertion was followed by the astonishing statement
that the misconduct "was a plus in favor" of the victimized party. Id. at 639, 133 Cal. Rptr. at
420. Some "plus." As it turned out, reality was not kind to the court's idea of litigational
advantage. The vacated jury award in Morris was $3,700,000. Id. at 621, 133 Cal. Rptr. at
408. However, when the case was retried sans misconduct, the second verdict came to
$4,800,000. Telephone Interview with Jerrold A. Fadem, attorney for defendants-appellants
(Aug. 30, 1991).
33. In Sabella, the California Supreme Court indicated that where the misconduct is se-
vere, the trial judge should intervene sua sponte. 70 Cal. 2d at 321 n.8, 449 P.2d at 756 n.8, 74
Cal. Rptr. at 540 n.8. That appears to be at most a hortatory statement, since the court, in
alfirming the misconduct-tainted judgment, hewed to the position that the victimized counsel
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egregious cases.
But if the victimized lawyer is caught off guard and misses a beat by
failing to go through this litany, the misconduct is deemed waived.35
Waiver, however, seems like an entirely inappropriate basis for such a
result. By settled law, waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known
right,36 and it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 37 It is
difficult to envision a lawyer ambushed by an adversary's misconduct
with only seconds to act as somehow making an informed, voluntary de-
cision to relinquish a client's vital right on which the outcome of the case
may ultimately turn. Nor is the clear and convincing standard to prove
waiver honored here. The offending lawyer need not offer "clear and
convincing evidence" of anything. In fact, the victimized lawyer is pre-
sumed to have waived his client's rights. 3' Thus, application of waiver
seems inappropriate in this context, and such a requirement is neither
fair nor realistic.
Practically speaking, this is an extremely harsh and unjustified rule
demonstrating the appellate courts' insensitivity to the burdens facing
trial counsel. Good lawyers with good cases prefer to pursue the merits,
not harangue their opponents. It is an old legal saw of enduring merit
that lawyers who have the facts on their side argue the facts, those who
must go through the usual ceremony as to each instance of misconduct before appellate relief
would even be considered. Id. at 318-21, 449 P.2d at 754-56, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 538-40.
34. Tingley v. Times-Mirror Co., 151 Cal. 1, 23, 89 P. 1097, 1106 (1907) ("It is only in
extreme cases that the court ... cannot, by instructing the jury to disregard such matters,
correct the impropriety ... and remove any effect [a lawyer's] conduct or remarks would
otherwise have."). This limitation, however, must be taken with a grain of salt. It is hard to
imagine more egregious misconduct than in Horn and Sabella. In Horn, for example, plain-
tiff's counsel repeatedly disparaged defendant, without referring to particular testimony, and
told jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the plaintiff when assessing damages. Horn, 61
Cal. 2d at 607-09, 394 P.2d at 564-65, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25. For facts ofSabella, see supra
note 4. Yet both these judgments were affirmed.
35. An objection without a request for jury admonition is insufficient to preserve the error
for appellate review. Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 320, 449 P.2d at 755, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The
victimized lawyer must object, assign the improper behavior as misconduct, and request a jury
admonition. But see People v. Kirkes, 39 Cal. 2d 719, 726, 249 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1952) (where
objectionable statements made by attorney were of such character that error could not be
cured by admonition, appellate court may reverse judgment when it appears there has been
miscarriage of justice).
36. City of Ukiah v. Fones, 64 Cal. 2d 104, 107, 410 P.2d 369, 370, 48 Cal. Rptr. 865, 866
(1966) (waiver is intentional relinquishment of known right after knowledge of facts and party
claiming waiver has burden of proof).
37. Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 39 Cal. 3d 374, 390, 703
P.2d 73, 82, 216 Cal. Rptr. 733, 742 (1985).
38. See Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 318, 449 P.2d at 754, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 538 (claim of miscon-
duct not entitled to consideration on appeal unless record shows proper objection and request
for admonition).
November 1991] RAMBO LITIGATION
have the law on their side argue the law, and those who have neither
pound the table and yell loud.39 Still, once the improper considerations
are introduced into the case the ethical lawyer is thrust into a dilemma.
Should he or she be content with the judge's often wishy-washy admoni-
tion (if one is to be had), get on with arguing the merits of the case and
hope for the best, or does prudence require that some countermeasures
be taken,' particularly when the improper accusation is not only irrele-
39. Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (S.D.N.Y.) (regarding
memorandum and affidavits alleging objections to misconduct as baseless), aff'd, 646 F.2d 560
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981).
40. An object lesson on the hazards involved is provided by City of Burbank v. Burbank
Generators, 2d Civ. No. 40197 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., July 2, 1973). There, in a condemna-
tion case, counsel for the city made an improper appeal to the jurors as taxpayers (an argument
expressly proscribed by Garden Grove School District v. Hendler, 63 Cal. 2d 141, 403 P.2d
721, 45 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965)). Id., slip op. at 3-4. Following an objection and a request for
mistrial, the trial court ruled as follows:
All right. The motion for mistrial is denied.
Mr. Soper [counsel for plaintiff], I think it would be unwise on your part, and
the Court directs you not to speak in terms of taxpayers. I think here the jury is
sophisticated and will follow the instructions of the Court, and they understand that
the City of Burbank will pay any judgment.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Thus, the trial court's "admonition"-apart from its milquetoast characterization of the
clearly improper remarks as "unwise" and its utter failure to admonish the jury to disregard
them-only emphasized the prejudicial taxpayer concerns. Moreover, it was factually incor-
rect; that particular project was not being funded with city funds, but with gas tax monies in
the nature of a statewide user tax, and the ambushed defense counsel said so. Id. The trial
judge's response to his error was something less than sensitive to the revelation that he had just
misinformed the jury: "THE COURT: Well, all right. Public funds, counsel." Id. at 4-5.
The aggrieved lawyer then made a command decision to deal with the problem in his jury
argument, which failed to carry the day. On appeal the court held that "if any prejudice
resulted from the quoted remarks, the responsibility for such result rests largely on counsel for
defendants." Id. at 10. Why? Because in dealing with the misconduct in his jury arguments,
the aggrieved lawyer tried to dispel the prejudice engendered by the improper remarks (coinci-
dentally, the very prescription suggested by Judge Reavley, see supra note 12 and accompany-
ing text) but to no avail. Therefore, any prejudice that resulted from the improper appeal to
jurors as taxpayers was the fault of the victimized counsel who, said the court, by his argument
emphasized these matters, rather than the fault of the lawyer who made the improper argu-
ment. Id. at 10-11.
In another case involving similar misconduct-an appeal to jurors as taxpayers in a con-
demnation case-the aggrieved lawyer duly objected but did not argue the matter to the jury.
People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Graziadio, 231 Cal. App. 2d 525, 533-34, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 29, 33-34 (1964). Incredibly, the trial judge ruled: "As a demonstration or example, I
think there is no impropriety in it. Obviously we are concerned with rules concerning the
matter of market value which will be explained to the jury, but this is, I presume an example."
Id. at 533, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 34. On appeal, after gently characterizing the misconduct as
"error" the court affirmed because it found no prejudice. Id. at 534, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
The lesson to victimized counsel that emerges from the juxtaposition of Burbank Genera-
tors with Graziadio is that you're damned if you do, and damned if you don't. The misbe-
having lawyer, on the other hand, gets to laugh all the way to the bank.
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vant and inflammatory, but also false?41 There are serious hazards either
way. The first approach runs the risk that the jury may find it suspicious
that the accusations, a staple of courtroom misconduct, are not refuted.
Of course, the second approach opens the door to claims of waiver and
diverts the jury's attention from the merits of the case properly before it,
which plays into the hands of the misbehaving lawyer.42
Many instances of courtroom misconduct take the form of improper
assertions launched out of the blue during jury arguments,43 while the
victimized lawyer is absorbed with taking notes on the adversary's argu-
ment and is continuously revising his own in order to respond effectively.
Under these circumstances, counsel may well be caught by surprise so
that the objection-cum-assignment-and-request-for-admonition litany is
imperfectly articulated.' Also, the victimized lawyer's tactical forensic
considerations may counsel a restrained approach, lest the jury be irri-
tated or the improper accusations emphasized.45
Assuming the victimized lawyer does everything right procedurally,
the appellate court may still decide that the error was not prejudicial.4"
41. E.g., Hendler, 63 Cal. 2d at 143-44 n.1, 403 P.2d at 722-23 n.1, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 314-
15 n.1. There, the condemnor's counsel, among other things, falsely accused the condemnee of
speculating in condemnation lawsuits, whatever that means. Id. How can trial counsel effec-
tively deal with such a charge when there is no longer an opportunity to present evidence that
would dispel it, or indeed any evidence at all? See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 40.
43. See, e.g., Hendler, 63 Cal. 2d at 143 & n.1, 403 P.2d at 722 & n.1, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 314
& n.l.
44. "The victim's attorney must be agile in trying to protect his client and his record.
Sometimes the professional oversight of failing to object and to observe the formality of re-
questing an instruction that misconduct be disregarded appears more serious than the miscon-
duct." 1 RAYMOND G. STANBURY, CALIFORNIA TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTIcE § 561, at
604 (1958).
45. This gives rise to a most difficult matter of litigation strategy. Having been an appel-
late lawyer for over two decades, I have often participated in the time-honored exchange in
which the appellate lawyer criticizes the trial lawyer for not making as good a record on appeal
as is desirable, while the trial lawyer criticizes the appellate lawyer for an unrealistic view of
the trial process, and explains in vivid language a trial advocate's need for flexibility that is
sensitive to the perceived courtroom dynamics of the moment. Both sides to this timeless
argument have meritorious points, but appellate judges generally tend to insist on a clear rec-
ord even if that is unrealistic in the context of persuasion of the trier of fact. C'est la vie. That
does not, however, justify an undue judicial tolerance of misconduct.
46. The better approach, however, was voiced in Gee v. Fong Poy, where the court con-
cluded that the "harmless error" doctrine did not apply in cases of this type, and "the appel-
late courts should not be called upon to spread it, like 'a mantle of sweet charity,' over
intentional acts of misconduct." 88 Cal. App. 627, 647, 264 P.2d 564, 572 (1928).
It is indeed difficult to see why the miscreant should be entitled to the benefit of specula-
tion as to the extent of the harm inflicted by his or her improper behavior. See Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1931) (refusing to speculate on effect
of counsel's misconduct on verdict and holding "no verdict can be permitted to stand which is
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When the court does so by an unpublished opinion-which is increas-
ingly "par for the course"47-no one outside the parties and their lawyers
even knows that the misconduct occurred. 8
These courtroom improprieties are tolerated by the bench not be-
cause California courts favor misconduct, but because they rationalize
away the immorality of their approach for the sake of preferred out-
comes49 and case dispositions-usually afirmances which avoid retri-
als.5 o These pragmatic considerations are evidently considered to be of
higher priority than effective enforcement of ethical trial lawyer conduct.
There are two additional judicial justifications for this approach.
First, requiring the victimized lawyer to seek a prompt jury admonition
to disregard the improper statements is likely to prevent repetition of the
misconduct.5" Also, the courts are concerned that a client with a merito-
rious case should not suffer because of his lawyer's behavior. 2
But these justifications do not withstand analysis. In many cases,
the misconduct permeates the proceedings, or is the centerpiece of jury
arguments, so that one has to view it as consciously pursued trial strat-
egy5 3 rather than a lapse in proper behavior occurring in the heat of the
found to be in any degree the result of appeals to passion and prejudice"). Still, California
courts routinely engage in such speculation. See, eg., Graziadio, 231 Cal. App. 2d at 534, 42
Cal. Rptr. at 34 (counsel's remark to jury was erroneous but in view of instruction and case as
whole, error was not prejudicial).
47. CAL. CT. R. 976 (West 1981) (rules for publication of appellate opinions). Since the
inception of the non-publication practice in the mid-1960s, see Gideon Kanner, The Unpub-
lished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386, 388 (1973), the incidence of
unpublished opinions has soared, so that by now most court of appeal opinions do not appear
either in the official court reporters or in the electronic data bases, such as Lexis or Westlaw.
See CAL. CT. R. 976(b) (court of appeal decisions presumed unpublishable).
48. See, eg., People v. Sunshine Canyon, Inc., 2d Civ. No. 36371 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist.,
Mar. 14, 1972). For an analysis of that case, see Gideon Kanner, Sic Transit Gloria: The Rise
and Fall of Mutuality of Discovery in California Eminent Domain Litigation, 6 Loy. L.A. L.
Rav. 447, 473-76 (1973).
49. The California Supreme Court has left no doubt that considerations of judicially pre-
ferred trial outcomes are an appropriate factor in the judicial calculus employed in the decision
whether to affirm or reverse. See Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 320-21, 449 P.2d at 755-56, 74 Cal.
Rptr. at 539-40.
50. See id. (affirning lower court).
51. Id. at 320, 449 P.2d at 755, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 539. It must be noted, however, that in
Sabella the aggrieved defense counsel objected to no avail. See id. at 322-24 n.1, 449 P.2d at
756-58 n.1, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540-42 n.1 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting). Still, the supreme court
refused to reverse the judgment, suggesting that the objections were directed to only one in-
stance of misconduct and this was not enough. Id. at 319, 449 P.2d at 754, 74 Cal. Rptr. at
538.
52. Id. at 321, 449 P.2d at 756, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
53. For example, in Sabella the court noted that the law firm whose member engaged in
misconduct in that case was also involved in similar misconduct in two other cases. Id. at 321
n.9, 449 P.2d at 756 n.9, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540 n.9. Yet, of the three cases, two were affirmed on
92 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:81
battle. Such behavior should be interdicted on principle, not rewarded
with affirmances. But the prevailing California rule, however parsed, ef-
fectively rewards these improprieties.
For example, misconduct is often unleashed as an ambush in the
midst of jury arguments.54 When that happens, the harm is done then
and there, cannot be addressed by additional evidence, and is not likely
to be undone by an admonition to disregard it. By then the parties'
presentations on the merits are concluded-and at times so is a substan-
tial part of the victimized party's summation-and little, if anything, can
be done by way of re-presenting the case55 to dispel or seriously mitigate
the prejudice engendered by the improper statements. My favorite simile
on this point is that this kind of misconduct is tantamount to the guilty
lawyer turning a skunk loose in the courtroom, with adverse counsel
lucky if this event is followed by the judge's admonition that the jurors
pay no attention to the smell. Experienced lawyers and sensible people
generally understand that in forensic combat, just as in a physical one, a
single underhanded dagger thrust can be just as lethal as repeated blows
with a blunt instrument. Neither situation lends itself to being cured
with Band-Aids applied after the fact.
The courts' justification for their equivocal approach to misconduct
as being based on concern for the misbehaving lawyer's client who, it is
said, should not suffer for the lawyer's transgressions is equally uncon-
appeal. Id. at 321, 449 P.2d at 756, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (affirming lower court); Horn, 61 Cal.
2d at 611, 394 P.2d at 566, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (same); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378,
404, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 199 (1964) (reversing lower court). If those results reflect the odds
facing a California trial lawyer contemplating misconduct tactics, the cynic might well be
justified in observing that "two out of three ain't bad."
As is amply illustrated by the cases cited, the victimized lawyer's plea to the trial judge to
interdict the misconduct, often not only fails to achieve the requested admonition and
whatever theoretical benefits are supposed to flow from it, but on the contrary tends to pro-
duce either express approval of the improper assertions, or an "admonition" that is so luke-
warm and equivocal as to be tantamount to a de facto depiction of the properly objecting
lawyer as an obstructionist. See supra notes 5, 13, 15, 16, 22 & 40 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Hendler, 63 Cal. 2d at 143 & n.1, 403 P.2d at 722 & n.1, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 314
& n. 1 (attorney personally attacked opposing party during jury argument); Burbank Genera-
tors, 2d Civ. No. 40197, slip op. at 3-4 (attorney made improper appeal to jurors as taxpayers).
55. As all experienced lawyers and judges well know, each side to a properly presented
case has a "theme" in mind, which the advocates use in an effort to convince the trier of fact of
the merits of their respective contentions. Getting into a position to do so is a painstaking
process in which lawyers try to introduce and arrange evidentiary bits and pieces into a coher-
ent and persuasive image of the facts in controversy, which they then hope the jury will accept
after hearing the summation. However, when the misbehaving lawyer unleashes entirely inap-
propriate factual or emotional considerations in the midst of that process of persuasion-after
all evidence is in and the painstakingly built-up "theme" cannot be reconstructed anew-it is
unrealistic to suggest that a few restrained, if not equivocal, words from the bench are likely to
undo the harm.
RAMBO LITIGATION
vincing." This argument betrays something less than complete imparti-
ality on the part of the courts espousing it. After all, are not both sides to
a lawsuit entitled to a fair trial? It is difficult to see why the ethical
lawyer's client should receive a lesser measure of judicial concern over
being fairly treated than the misbehaving counsel's client. As Chief Jus-
tice Traynor put it in his dissent in Sabella v. Southern Pacific Co. :
"The right to a fair trial includes the right to an impartial trier of fact
and the correlative right to a trial free of appeals to passion and preju-
dice."58 That right, one would think, applies equally to both parties in
the lawsuit.
California courts refuse to grant sanctions as a matter of decisional
law, 9 taking the position that absent statutory authority such decisions
"may imperil the independence of the bar."'  Bauguess v. Paine6 held
that the only remedy for misbehavior is to hold the offending individual
in contempt of court 62 -a "remedy" totally useless in trial misconduct
cases where the behavior, though occasionally outrageous vis-d-vis the
actor's opponent, does not usually reach the level of interference with the
proceedings or defiance of court orders that would justify a finding of
contempt.63
In any event, if courts are-indeed concerned with fairness to clients,
the misbehaving lawyers who caused the financial burdens of litigational
inefficiencies should bear them. These burdens should not be borne by
their clients, and certainly not by their victims."
56. Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 321, 449 P.2d at 756, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
57. 70 Cal. 2d 311, 449 P.2d 750, 74 Cal. Rptr. 534, cert denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
58. Id. at 326, 449 P.2d at 759, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
59. See Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978) (ex-
plaining that California appellate courts have disallowed fee awards as sanctions under theory
of inherent supervisory power, but superseded by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982
& Supp. 1991) which provides that trial court shall have power to order party to pay attorney's
fees incurred by opposing party "as a result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or
solely intended to cause unnecessary delay").
60. Id. at 638, 586 P.2d at 949, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
61. 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978) (superseded by CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991)).
62. See id.
63. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 sanctions, FED. R. Civ. P. 11, and California
Civil Procedure Code sanctions, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991),
are not discussed here. These rules primarily address lawyers' improprieties committed in
writing. On the federal side, at least, the ongoing experiment with an expanded Rule 11 that
enlarges courts' powers to impose sanctions on lawyers filing papers in bad faith has now
inspired demands that it be abandoned. Jeffrey N. Cole, Rule 11 Now, LITIG., Spring 1991, at
10, 51.
64. See State ex rel. Public Works Bd. v. Bragg, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1026, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 576, 581 (1986) (counsel's failure to comply with local rules not imputed to client where
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There comes a point beyond which judicial equivocations-which in
the end give economic aid and comfort and thus de facto encouragement
to misbehaving lawyers-must yield to elemental decency. Otherwise,
the process of judicial conflict resolution cannot command public re-
spect. That idea was well captured by Justice Friedman:
In our exalted moments we of the bench and bar are wont to
describe a trial as a "search for truth." Forensic hijinks such as
the present make a mockery of that description. The financial
stakes in personal injury trials are high. The participants are
engaged in a relentless struggle. Appellate wrist-slappings are
not going to stop the unseemly stagecraft which characterizes
many jury trials.6"
IV. JUDICIAL TOLERANCE AS A FACTOR ENCOURAGING RAMBO-
STYLE TACTICS
To the extent recent concerns with "Rambo tactics" reflect an in-
crease in lawyer misconduct,66 what is going on here is an interplay of
incentives and disincentives. When unethical conduct is not interdicted
in the courtroom, and is defacto treated no worse than proper behavior,
it should not be surprising that the former displaces the latter as the
prevailing norm. High-minded, abstract exhortations in appellate opin-
ions are not likely to make many converts among lawyers predisposed to
such tactics, when those opinions simultaneously affirm the wrongdoers'
lucrative victories.67 What is at stake is money-lots of it. Recent years
have seen a dramatic escalation in the stakes involved in many lawsuits.
Seven-figure verdicts are now common.68 It is therefore unrealistic to
"client is relatively free from fault and the attorney's neglect amounts to positive
misconduct").
65. Hart v. Wielt, 4 Cal. App. 3d 224, 238, 84 Cal. Rptr. 220, 229 (1970) (Friedman,
Acting Presiding J., dissenting).
66. But see Brewer & Majorie, supra note 2, at 841-44, where the authors argue that
lamentations about the decline in professionalism among lawyers are hardly new. It does give
one pause to reflect on the possibility that what we are at the moment deploring as Rambo
litigation are the "good old days" for the next generation of lawyers.
67. See Sabella v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Cal. 2d 311, 317 n.4, 449 P.2d 750, 753 n.4, 74
Cal. Rptr. 534, 537 n.4, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) (noting that members of personal
injury bar have written books "suggesting a variety of somewhat deceptive means of eliciting
sympathy for litigants appearing before a jury. Such tactics are not a part of the repertoire of
the ethical professional man." (citations omitted)).
In spite of such pieties, the widely reported upsurge in Rambo litigation seems to confirm
the pessimistic view that, increasingly, lawyers would just as soon forego the appellation of
"ethical professional" men and women and take the money instead.
68. These days, a million dollars may not be what it was when the California Supreme
Court decided Horn and Sabella. Still, paraphrasing the bon mot of the late Senator Everett
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assume that misbehaving lawyers will mend their ways when the bottom
line of the opinion in which their conduct is in issue, is in fact a bankable
victory, albeit one accompanied by a toothless admonition to go and sin
no more.
69
The primary moral blame for courtroom excesses must, of course,
be placed squarely on the misbehaving lawyers. That, however, is not
quite the end of the story. The name of the game is litigation. Lawyer
misconduct of this type takes place in courtrooms which are the domain
of judges. Judges formulate and administer the rules by which litigation
is conducted. Judges control litigation and set the tone and norms of
acceptable courtroom behavior. They are the one branch of a tri-partite
government that can interdict misconduct within their own domain any-
time they choose.7" But all too often they simply do not.71
Lawyers are partisan and have large stakes in the outcome of litiga-
tion. Thus, while it may be deplorable, it is only to be expected that
some of them will succumb to the temptation to cut corners. That is why
we have rules governing lawyers' conduct.72 Judges, on the other hand,
are supposed to be neutral and committed to nonpartisan public interest.
They are the government officials charged with the administration of fair,
even-handed justice, and their job is to enforce the rules. It is therefore
indefensible for a judge to wash his or her hands of the problem, let the
litigation process seek its lowest tolerablelevel, and then say-as defacto
Dirksen, a million here, a million there, and pretty soon you're talkin' real money. Allan
Sloan, Anchor Savings Bank Deal with FDIC Leaves Much to Be Desired, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
1991, at D3. Even in these post-inflationary days, astonishingly large sums are commonly
obtainable through the judicial process, and once obtained, they can set one up for life. Thus,
the temptations to engage in improper conduct in order to secure victory, as well as the oppor-
tunity to yield to these temptations, are considerable and widespread.
69. See Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 321, 449 P.2d at 756, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
70. Many judge-made substantive rules, particularly in the law of torts, unequivocally de-
mand and impose with a vengeance, reasonable, good faith conduct on lay members of society.
In this context, it is simply absurd to suggest that those same judges are somehow incapable of
effectively imposing similarly high-minded standards of behavior on "officers of the court"
intimately involved in the transaction of essential judicial business in their own courtrooms.
71. See, e.g., Sabella, 70 Cal. 2d at 322-24 n.1, 449 P.2d at 756 n.1, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540
n.1 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting) (setting out portions of transcript that make clear ineffectiveness
of trial judge who frequently did not even bother to rule on aggrieved lawyer's objections).
Adding insult to injury, the Sabella majority stated "a [trial] court should on its own
initiative intercede to prevent potentially prejudicial conduct of counsel. Such action here,
directed either at counsel or to the jury, not only might have mitigated the prejudice here
alleged, but it would have enhanced the dignity and demeanor of the proceedings." Id. at 321
n.8, 449 P.2d at 756 n.8, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 540 n.8. Of course, the trial court did no such thing,
but the judgment was affirmed nevertheless.
72. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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did the California Supreme Court in Sabella-that the end justifies the
means. That is nothing short of a surrender to the barbarians among us.
Such concerns are not only important to the litigants, but to the
courts as well. Because courts are physically the weakest branch of gov-
ernment, judges must scrupulously cultivate a public perception that
what transpires in their courtrooms under their eyes represents a relent-
less quest by dedicated people for fairness and even-handed enforcement
of rules by which all must live. This they must do to maintain public
respect indispensable to long-term successful court operations. True, in
an imperfect world this can only be an ideal to be strived for. Nonethe-
less, when judges cease such striving and permit self-styled Rambos to
transform their temples of justice into jungle habitats, they trifle with the
very foundations of their stature in society.73
Judges ask that we pay homage to them by rising when they enter a
courtroom, by addressing them as "Your Honor" and the like. A judge
is the only official in the American system of government who can sum-
marily imprison a citizen for no more than being rude in dealing with
him or her.74 To justify that level of adulation and power, judges owe us
something in return. At a minimum they owe us a fair roll of the dice,
untainted by tolerance of abuse, intimidation and deception. They owe
us-you should pardon the expression-justice. That can be an elusive
commodity at times, but Americans are entitled to the judicial best in its
pursuit. If that is not the essence of the judicial function, then what is?
V. THE SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS
To sum up, it is clear that Rambo litigation is new in name only. As
a style of litigation it has been with us for some time. It does, however,
appear to be more pervasive now. But whether then or now, it thrives
because it is effective often enough to be attractive to lawyers who care
more about results than anything else, and because judges, for all their
73. It is beyond the scope of this Article, and yet it cannot go without mention, that one
visible response to the growing dissatisfaction with what goes on in the courts-of which mis-
conduct of counsel, disregard for professional proprieties, and the alarming decline in civility
are but one part-has been the explosive growth of private judging. In this process, the law-
yers of parties interested in prompt and fair dispute resolution walk away from the public
courts, and stipulate to the appointment of mutually agreed upon retired judges who act as
referees orjudgespro tern and decide cases-usually quickly and fairly. Gideon Kanner, Rent-
A-Judges A Result, Not Cause, Of Court's Problems, L.A. DAILY J., May 15, 1991, at 7.
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) (allowing federal court power to fine or imprison at its
discretion for contempt of its authority any person for misbehavior in or near its presence,
misbehavior of court officers, or disobedience to a lawful writ, process order, rule, decree or
command); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (establishing acts or
omissions which are contempts of authority of court).
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familiar pieties, do not care enough about lawyers' behavior taking place
in their courtrooms to interdict excesses effectively. Because of the ab-
sence of effective disincentives to improper conduct and because it has
gone on for so long, misconduct has become a folkway of a significant
segment of the profession, and-if the many anecdotal reports are any-
where near correct-that segment is growing. If judges really mean to
do something about the problem, it will take something more on their
part than an occasional sermon to civilize the litigation process.
Admittedly, many judges bear heavy burdens, particularly in busy
metropolitan courts where they have to confront a tidal wave of cases
presenting them with a daunting incidence of in-prepared lawyers of
doubtful competence and even more doubtful ethics, pressing their cli-
ents' causes every which way they can, as the old saying goes. Having to
instruct such a "clientele" in the rudiments of civilized courtroom behav-
ior may well be a difficult task that busy judges rightly find distasteful.
Well might they ask: isn't that a job for law schools?
It certainly is-in the first instance. But as experienced teachers
know all too well, it is folly to suppose that what is taught is learned,
particularly when the learning is not reinforced by real world experience.
For example, in the wake of the Watergate scandals, law schools insti-
tuted expanded mandatory legal ethics instruction programs, and the bar
exam now includes an ethics component. The results? In 1989, forty-
one percent of the California Supreme Court opinions dealt with lawyer
discipline cases.75 In the immortal words of Archie Bunker: "I rest my
case."
76
One reason these shocking statistics prevail is that under the rubric
of legal ethics, the California State Bar disciplinary apparatus is called
upon to deal with lawyer behavior that, in addition to what we think of
as legal ethical transgressions (such as conflicts of interest and commin-
gling client funds) is generally dishonest, tortious, or even criminal, and
has little to do with the "legal" qualifier. For example, when a lawyer
takes a client's money and fails to file a lawsuit which was the object of
the transaction, that, one hopes, will result in bar disciplinary action.77
75. See Lisa Stansky, 5-Year Evolution of Court Caseload Causes Concern, RECORDER
(San Francisco), Jan. 9, 1990, Supplement, at 4. During the following year, 1990 to 1991,
attorney discipline cases accounted for 38% of California Supreme Court opinions. Gerald F.
Uelmen, The Disappearing Dissenters, CAL. LAW., June 1991, at 34, 37. To give these figures
some context, as recently as 1986 attorney discipline cases consumed only eight percent of the
court's opinions. Id.
76. All in the Family (CBS television broadcast).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (governing attorney's failure to
act diligently).
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Yet there is nothing "legal" about that any more than in any other trans-
action in which consideration is paid, but the contracted for services or
goods are not forthcoming. For some strange reason this distinction is
often missed.7 8 While law schools can teach legal ethics, it is difficult to
understand how anyone can seriously expect law schools-graduate pro-
fessional schools teaching adult college graduates-to perform the func-
tion of revealing to their students that it is wrong to steal clients' money
or to commit insurance fraud. Isn't that a job for one's Mom and Dad?
Or is the teaching of morals in the home a hopelessly old-fashioned con-
cept? It must be.
The first recommendation of the Interim Report of the Committee on
Civility in the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit is that law schools imple-
ment "civility training."' 79 I do believe this recommendation appears to
be serious. It does note, however, that "some legal educators say" that
"[t]eaching civility may be equally, if not more, difficult than teaching
ethics."8 Indeed. What is one to teach in such a course? That the stu-
dents refrain from being obnoxious liars operating on the premise that
the end justifies the means? Didn't Mom and Dad mention anything
about that either?81
78. I was once a percipient witness to a conversation between a colleague and a distin-
guished jurist, in which the latter, evidently in all seriousness, expressed a wish that law
schools would step up their ethics teaching because of the alarming rise in bar disciplinary
matters involving such serious transgressions as armed bank robbery and insurance fraud. The
speaker, a highly regarded and intelligent man, did not seem to comprehend that by the time
one is of an age to be a law student, it would seem to be a bit late in the game to teach him or
her that it is wrong to rob banks. Nonetheless, ever after that conversation I have duly cau-
tioned students not to do so. At least thus far, no word has reached me that any of my former
charges has heisted a bank.
79. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
80. Id.
81. It is not my intention to appear unduly flippant about this distressing problem. I note
with approval the Interim Report's further recommendations that considerations of civility be
a part of the Inns of Court program and-probably more importantly-of law firm training.
Id. at 48-49. The American Inns of Court Foundation provides legal education and training
of law students which continues throughout an attorney's career. Id. at 48. Its purpose is to
promote excellence in legal advocacy and enhance individual capability. Id. at 49. Of course,
the Inns of Court program is voluntary, so this may be a case of preaching to the converted.
Still, stress laid on proper behavior by serious professional role models is far more likely to
make an impression than lectures by professors, many of whom these days would be hard put
to find the courthouse, much less really know what goes on inside.
Moreover, in the case of law firms-assuming that they are indeed committed to civility
in litigation, which is not an assumption to be lightly made-these role models have the added
persuasive power of being the individuals who get to pass on the trainees' salaries and partner-
ship potential. That is pretty likely to get the trainees' attention. Of course, all that may be
wishful thinking, because much of the overly aggressive behavior of young lawyers follows
what they perceive to be the desire and example of their law firm peers and superiors. And
there's the rub. Aggressive, contentious litigation generates contested court appearances,
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Thus, neither the courts nor the law schools can look to each other
for salvation in this regard. Given the all too evident lacunae of par-
ents, 2 it is difficult to see how these institutions can be expected to re-
form the basic ethical values of adults in the space of three years. And
so, the job is an ongoing one-a part of the never-ending struggle. Here
as elsewhere in life, Edmund Burke's observation that for evil to succeed
it is only necessary that good people do nothing, 3 holds true. A solution
can only come from an interaction of the two institutions: law schools
must teach the rules that govern legal ethics and proper courtroom be-
havior and the courts must enforce them. There is room for improve-
ment in both institutions.8 4 But neither can rectify a quarter-century of
parental and societal failures by insisting on a three-unit "civility" course
in graduate school.
which generate billable hours and make it that much easier for a gung-ho young associate to
hit the expected 2000+ billable hours per year. If elaboration is needed, see INTERIM RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 21, describing the practice of large firms that seek Rule 11 sanctions as a
routine strategy in virtually every case. See also Alan Abrahamson, Insurer's Suit Warns Law-
yers to Watch Bills, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1991, at DI (reporting $1.5 million settlement against
law firm charged with "scorched-earth" policy in preparing insurer's cases for trial in manner
generating millions of dollars in fees).
There is nothing new about lawyers from large "downtown" firms being arrogant and
disdainful of their opponents. This attitude provides fertile ground for the more serious ex-
cesses that we are witnessing.
82. Mom and Dad, it would appear, have been so busy lately working hard and pursuing
the good life that their lapses with regard to their offspring are manifold. Over the years, to me
fell the task of instructing hundreds of young-and anything but underprivileged-adults on
how to dress for court. Many thanked me privately for that, explaining that in their highly
self-indulgent, informal young lifestyle, it was a rare occasion to have to select proper suits and
haberdashery for an occasion of some formality, so that many of them simply did not know
about the importance of business suits, appropriate shirts and ties, conservative dresses, proper
grooming and similar matters of interest to lawyers appearing in court.
83. See EDMUND BURKE, THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DIscoNTENTS
(1770).
84. I once flunked one-third of a senior class in legal ethics. It was an objective, blind-
graded exam of no great difficulty. In the wake of the ensuing hue and cry, the law school
administration permitted the "flunkees" to take the exam over again. But I digress. Or do I?
Nor is my experience in that regard unique. A similar incident took place at the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley School of Law. See Rex Bossert, Irked Boalt Students Get the
Better of a Professor, S.F. DAILY J., Sept. 9, 1991, at 1. The students there found the teaching
of legal ethics boring, and did not attend class properly. On the average, attendance was less
than one-third of the class-an experience not too dissimilar to mine. Id. at 8. The students
were duly warned that if they did not do the work, they would have difficulty on the exam.
The warning went unheeded with predictable results: some 14% of the exam takers flunked.
Id. So what did the law school administration do? You guessed it! It afforded the "flunkees"
a make-up exam, and made special arrangements to let them take the bar exam in spite of their
temporarily failing grades. Id. Explained Boalt Hall Dean Jesse Choper: the law school took
the unusual step of permitting the re-examination because it "fails very few people." Id.
And so it goes. Res ipsa loquitor.
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Yet for all their common interests, there is a point at which law
schools and courts diverge. Law schools can only take the horse to
water, but the courts have to make the beast drink.8" It is the courts'
special job to enforce the law. To the extent lawyers violate legal rules
that are supposed to govern their conduct, the job winds up in judges'
laps, the same as all other law violations. That goes with the territory,
and with the black robe.
An additional problem that needs to be considered is the recently
hatched and widely huckstered image of the legal profession as affluent,
powerful and glamorous. 6 This "L.A. Law" syndrome has attracted to
the law hordes of bright, aggressive, highly motivated careerists who are
sometimes temperamentally, and at times, morally unfit 7 for lawyers'
work of truly professional caliber. Many of them enroll in law school
without any formed career goals or any understanding of what lawyers
do.88 To make matters worse, they are increasingly taught law by a
85. We are up against Dirty Harry's dictum that a man must know his limitations. MAG-
NUM FORCE (Malapaso Co. 1973). So must institutions. Watergate furnishes a means of mak-
ing my point. Even though the Watergate scandal led to a widespread beefing up of the
teaching of legal ethics in law schools, I have yet to meet a single person willing to voice a
belief that if young Dicky Nixon and Johnny Ehrlichman had only had the benefit of good
ethics courses in law school, Watergate would not have happened. Also, there does not appear
to be much dispute that Judge Sirica's tough approach to sentencing in that case accomplished
more than any legal ethics course. For a general discussion of Watergate and ethics, see Don-
ald T. Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 261 (1975).
86. See, eg., Alan Abrahamson, Applications Hit Record Highs for U.S. Law Schools; In-
crease Attributed to Impact of Television Hit 'LA. Law,' L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1989, at II-1.
87. The temperamental unfitness that is pertinent to the present topic is manifested by
individuals possessed of a basically hostile personality or pursuing a strident ideological
agenda, or both. Upon entering the legal profession they discover that these traits, far from
being a handicap, are admired and rewarded by peers and clients alike. In that context, some
of these individuals tend to lose all moral restraint and concentrate solely on results which,
coincidentally, provide them with a subjectively highly gratifying opportunity to vent inner
hostility, while simultaneously earning high praise from peers and high fees from clients. The
correlative facet of this type of personality is that it often fails to distinguish between benefits
garnered for one's own client and detriments imposed on one's opponent. By degrees, the two
become telescoped into each other. Putting pressure on one's opponent is at times a useful
tactic, particularly in those cases where settlement is achievable, or where the adverse party
procrastinates. The problem is that some lawyers fail to appreciate the difference between the
legitimacy of pressure in such cases and just making life difficult for one's adversary on general
principles, thereby maintaining a reputation as a tough litigator who gets results.
88. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Disso-
nance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231 (1991):
When I consider the queries I currently receive from bright second- and third-year
law students, I am struck by how little they and we know about the basics of the
practice of law and the legal profession. I cannot think of any other profession that
requires a postgraduate degree and yet provides so little information about students'
future careers. For example, some students have told me that billing two thousand
hours a year should not be a problem, since it averages only forty hours per week for
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philosophically and ideologically oriented professorate that decries sta-
bility of legal rules, 89 is more interested in "changing the system" than in
understanding it, that increasingly disdains private practice, has little un-
derstanding of it and to an alarming extent is alienated from the main-
stream of traditional American societal and professional values.90 This is
hardly an atmosphere tending to engender respect for the practice of law
and its traditions. All these factors contribute to significant numbers of
lawyers entering the profession who are not "into" the spirit of lawyering
as an adversarial and occasionally tough, and yet civilized way of resolv-
ing disputes. The lawyer's equivalent of the code of chivalry-the idea
that one is free to deliver hard blows but is not at liberty to strike foul
ones9 -is growing quaintly anachronistic.
This new mindset is to a significant extent rooted in the excesses of
the 1960s when the bizarre idea of continuously ongoing social
destabilization as a virtue took root, and when it somehow became ac-
ceptable, and indeed fashionable to engage in vehement verbal or even
physical assault on the ideas and individuals with whom one disagrees,
and to substitute invective for discourse. People influenced by such mat-
ters in their formative years are not likely to mature with an understand-
fifty weeks; they have no clue about the tremendous effort and discipline it takes to
bill at that hectic clip over the year.
Id. at 1258.
89. If anyone thinks these observations to be hyperbolic, refer to the Journal of Legal
Education, where there may be found a debate as to whether there is even such a thing as a
"wrong answer" to a legal question. See Paul T. Hayden, On "Wrong" Answers in the Law
School Classroom, 40 J. LEGAL EDuc. 251 (1990); Paul R. Joseph, Yes, Virginia, There Are
Wrong Answers: A Reply to Professor Hayden, 40 J. LEGAL EDuc. 473 (1990); David P. Leo-
nard, On "Right" and "Wrong" Answers: A Reply to Professor Hayden, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC.
477 (1990). In the immortal words of the legal columnist for the New York Times, today's law
professors would rather be teaching anything but law. David Margolick, At the Bar: Conclave
in Herringbone Ponders Lofty and Mundane in Legal Education's Muddled Mission, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1989, at B6; see also Johnson, supra note 88, at 1239 & n.30 (attributing line to
Professor Jay Westbrook of University of Texas).
90. See Johnson, supra note 88, at 1238-39.
Law schools, at least elite law schools, now attempt (poorly, I believe) to educate
their students in economics, political philosophy, hermeneutics, and epistemology.
Perhaps we are doing a splendid job of preparing our best and brightest students to
become law professors, molded in our own image. However, for the remaining stu-
dents something is missing, and I contend that the something may be the study of
legal doctrines and legal rules beyond the first year of law school and the study of the
legal profession qua legal profession.
Id. at 1239 (footnotes omitted).
91. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that misconduct of U.S.
Attorney may be so gross and persistent as to call for stern rebuke, even for granting of mis-
trial and that U.S. Attorney has duty to refrain from improper methods meant to produce
wrongful convictions as well as to use every legitimate means to bring about just ones), over-
ruled on other grounds by Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
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ing of and commitment to self-discipline and adherence to a traditional
code of honor. Moreover, such behavior patterns, once released from
their societal Pandora's boxes and legitimized as acceptable conduct, do
not take kindly to being stuffed back in. One has to live with them for a
long time, with changes long in coming. Such changes are, of course,
beyond the courts' ability to bring about by decree, however much some
judges may have once thought that to be the case.92 But like it or not,
the courts like other institutions, have to contend with the end product of
it all, at least insofar as these latter-day notions of morality surface in
litigation.
Another concern, however, involves the courts more directly.
Recent years have seen an alarming decline in intellectual self-discipline
among judges, so that inconsistencies and outright conflicts in the law are
common. The gradual acceptance by both sides of the political spectrum
of freewheeling judicial activism as a legitimate method of governance,
93
has with the passage of time tended to load the bench with individuals
more concerned with advancement of ideological agendas than with dis-
pute resolution. The ongoing tensions between the different judicial
"wings" has by degrees led to a candid-or perhaps cynical-recognition
that the resolution of one's case may depend entirely on the identity of
the judge to whom fate has dealt the task of presiding over the litiga-
tion.94 Nor can one overlook the fact that the burgeoning litigation has
92. See Matthew 0. Tobriner, Can Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the Courts?,
47 CAL. ST. B.J. 294, 297-98 (1972), in which the author, then an Associate Justice of the
California Supreme Court, called for a "social revolution" to be "accomplished through the
courts.
93. In a tragicomic display, liberal jurists who only yesterday proudly marched under the
unfurled banner of judicial activism are now loudly denouncing their conservative counter-
parts for the sin of-you guessed it-judicial activism. See Raoul Berger, The Name of the
Game is "Two Can Play," L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1991, at B7 (arguing that if liberals can be
"activist," so can conservatives); Judge Stephen Reinhardt, "Conservative" Rehnquist Court
Unmasks its Naked Activism, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at B7 ("A far different term from
'conservative' is needed to describe the activist right-wing majority that is currently rewriting
U.S. constitutional law in its own image."); Stuart Taylor Jr., Scalia's Views, Stylishly Ex-
pressed, Line Up With Reagan's, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1986, at D27 ("While conservative
critics of the Supreme Court have often assailed its 'liberal judicial activism,' Judge Scalia has
recognized that judicial activism is a tool sometimes used by conservatives as well as
liberals.").
94. Again, detailed exploration of such matters is beyond the scope of this Article, but the
fact is that conflicts in the law are endemic, so that in many areas it borders on the impossible
for a lawyer to advise a client reliably what acts need to be done, or refrained from, to conform
to "the law" that ostensibly governs the situation at hand.
Each lawyer no doubt has his or her own favorite area in which this is the case. In my
own field of substantive expertise (eminent domain and inverse condemnation) the United
States Supreme Court has conceded its own inability to articulate a set of constituent elements
of a constitutional cause of action for a nonphysical taking. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
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produced such case loads as to render both state and federal supreme
courts incapable of shaping and pruning the developing law.95 As a re-
sult many judges at the intermediate appellate level operate in the appar-
ent belief that their decision-making is all but immune to supreme court
review on the merits. Consequently, conflicts in the law are
commonplace.
This pervasive uncertainty erodes the perception of "the law" as a
set of rules to live by, and it is folly to believe that the intellectual anar-
chy growing by degrees within the law can neatly confine itself to pene-
trating various substantive, procedural, and remedial rules, but will
obligingly stop at the boundaries of those that govern lawyers' behavior.
Increasing, and increasingly open, judicial result-orientation engenders
an attitude among lawyers that virtually anything is worth trying, be-
cause-who knows?-perhaps the particular judge before whom one ap-
pears will like the sought-for result, and will find a way to achieve it,
even if, figuratively speaking, holding his or her nose. Or if not the trial
judge, then perhaps the fates will be kinder on appeal.96
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). As for the question of when such a cause of action-
assuming one knows how to state it-is sufficiently "ripe" under Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), to allow the would-be plaintiff
access to federal courts in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), terms such as "arcane,"
"byzantine," "talmudic," "jesuitical," and "mindboggling" come readily to mind, and even
they probably fail to do justice to the complexity, unreliability-if not outright treacherous-
ness-of such rules as may be discerned from the bewildering and contradictory case law even
by highly knowledgeable and experienced practitioners.
Those readers who have not had occasion to slog through this swamp may find an inter-
esting introduction in Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Prin-
ciples, Part I - A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299 (1989),
which demonstrates that United States Supreme Court decisions in this field are devoid of any
consistency or discernible underlying doctrine. As for the procedural aspects of that subject,
see Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness" Mess in Federal Land Use Cases, or How the Supreme
Court Converted Federal Judges Into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON PLANNING, ZONING &
EMINENT DOMAIN 7-1.
95. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982)
(stating that inconsistent decisions are inevitable due to increasing caseloads and multi-mem-
ber composition of United States Supreme Court); see also Paul Bator & Charles Fried, What
Is Wrong With the Supreme Court, 51 U. Prr. L. REv. 673, 686-87 (1990) (asserting that
judicial workload is one factor promoting "cacophony" in court decisions).
96. Appeal in this context, does not, of course, include those situations in which lawyers
take on the difficult task of trying to persuade the courts to "make new law." That is a horse
of a different color. Rather, this criticism is directed at cases where lawyers seek and obtain
appellate rulings that either ignore or contradict existing law, without any effort at intellectual
reconciliation.
For a statistical overview of how differently different appellate judges see the law, see, for
example, Gideon Kanner & Gerald F. Uelmen, Random Assignment, Random Justice, L.A.
LAW., Feb. 1984, at 10, 12, demonstrating that in the California Court of Appeal for the
Second District (Los Angeles) the most important correlation factor with regard to affirmance
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Such concerns, of course, involve hotly debated substantive, philo-
sophical and ideological matters that go far beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. Nonetheless, this factor of pervasive uncertainty in the formulation
and application of the ostensibly governing rules must be kept in mind.
What the misconduct of counsel problem is ultimately about is a spread-
ing belief among lawyers that they are not really bound by the rules that
are supposed to govern their conduct, and can flout them with impunity,
because, when it comes right down to it, they can win in spite of the fact
that "the law" ostensibly proscribes their methods. After all, bending or
disregarding "the law" often works for clients whom they represent; why
shouldn't it work for them too?
The irony of the present Rambo litigation problem is that its coming
was predicted. In the concluding words to his dissent in Sabella v.
Southern Pacific Co. ,9 Chief Justice Traynor foreshadowed the future.
After noting the judicial inconsistency in guarding parties' rights by in-
sisting on first selecting fair-minded jurors shielded from knowledge of
the contested facts, and then permitting those jurors to be exposed to
inadmissible and sometimes false factual assertions and improper argu-
ments of counsel, he said:
It is a minimum propriety to guard against calculated attempts
to prejudice the jury inside the courtroom, for they do violence
to the substantial rights of a litigant. Still worse, they would in
the long run so debase the judicial process that no one could
enter a courtroom confident of a fair trial.
98
It is now twenty years later; welcome to Rambo litigation.
Nor was the Chief Justice alone. The argument made to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Heidi Rossi's unsuccessful petition for hearing99 by
her appellate counsel, Edward L. Lascher, late dean of the California
appellate bar, was eloquent and prescient and warrants repetition:
It is submitted that a principal reason the courts experi-
versus reversal, publication versus nonpublication of the opinion, grant of review or depublica-
tion of the opinion by the supreme court, is the identity of the court's division. These data
verify an earlier unpublished study performed independently without these authors' knowl-
edge. See Robert S. Thompson & John B. Oakley, From Information to Opinion in Appellate
Courts. How Funny Things Happen on the Way Through the Forum, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1,
46-52 (1986).
It is difficult to accept the idea that such great disparities in these rates are the product of
mere chance.
97. 70 Cal. 2d 311, 321, 449 P.2d 750, 756, 74 Cal. Rptr. 534, 540, cert. denied, 395 U.S.
960 (1969).
98. Id. at 326, 449 P.2d at 759-60, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
99. See supra note 15.
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ence periodic outbreaks of the disease of misconduct is their
own stout refusal to utilize any curative or preventive medicine.
That, of course, is the way of diseases.
As long as those described by the late Raymond Stanbury
(certainly no hothouse-flower in the courtroom) as "the buc-
caneers of the profession" know that the worst they are risking
by such tactics is a mild (and probably unpublished) "tut-
tut"-knowing that a verdict they obtain that way is impregna-
ble against any attack except the impossible height of proving
that the victim would have won otherwise-they are going to
be tempted to employ misconduct as a regular weapon of advo-
cacy. And they will yield to the temptation.
Indeed, a case may be made (however distastefully) for the
proposition that they should do so. After all, the advocate's
first duty is to his client, not to fairness or the dignity of the
profession or anything of that sort. He must utilize all lawful
means to advance his client's interest. Current decisions seem
to conclude that misconduct is a lawful means unless it can be
proved that, absent misconduct, the opposite result would have
been reached. Therefore, any lawyer who knows that there is a
reasonable possibility that his client could win even without
misconduct, is acting lawfully when he fortifies that possibility
by embracing misconduct.
Such is a horrifying and cynical view of an honorable pro-
fession and the state of judicial administration, but it is unmis-
takably coming over the horizon.1°
VI. CONCLUSION
The California rule governing misconduct of counsel was never
good law-certainly not law that is defensible on any basis other than the
dubious proposition that the end justifies the means. It was a Faustian
bargain with expediency, that de facto elevated trial lawyer misconduct,
even at its most prejudicial, into a quasi-legitimate forensic technique.
100. Petition for Hearing at 8-9, Rossi v. Osborn, 2d Civ. No. 40100 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d
Dist., June 6, 1973).
In emphasizing these bits of prescience, it is not suggested that it is this judicial tolerance
of misconduct that is the cause of our present predicament. Rather, this tolerance lowered the
barriers so that when the more recent pressures of greater competitiveness among lawyers,
greed and attendant billing pressures, to say nothing of the behavioral changes engendered by
the Great American Temper Tantrum of the 1960s, impacted on the litigation process, the
newly enlisted Rambos found the situation ripe for picking. But that, as Lascher noted twenty
years ago, is the way of all diseases, isn't it?
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But as is the case with such bargains, the time comes sooner or later
when consideration must be paid-with interest. The tragedy is that be-
cause of the time lag that is inherent in such matters, it is not the law-
yers, judges and clients who nolens volens entered into the bargain that
must pay the price. Rather, the succeeding generation gets stuck with
the tab for the free lunch, and must face the hard fact that the bargain,
apart from being immoral, produces increasingly intolerable side effects.
That is usually the case with institutional arrangements that contradict
basic notions of morality subscribed to by a society. There often are
good, pragmatic reasons underlying ethical rules, but that may not be
fully apparent until the rules are discarded and a lapse of time follows.
Overruling Horn v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. 101 and
Sabella v. Southern Pacific Co., 02 would be a desirable step toward a
solution to the problem of lawyer misconduct. As a minimum, a rule
should be imposed shifting the burden of defending the prejudicial as-
pects vel non of the misconduct to the party who has been its beneficiary
in the trial court.103
A model for this conceptual approach already exists in Chapman v.
California 104 which, obverting the usual allocation of burdens in demon-
strating prejudice on appeal, requires that in cases of constitutional viola-
tions, the respondent is required to demonstrate freedom from
prejudice. 10 There is no principled reason why such a modest step
should not be taken at least in cases in which serious misconduct of coun-
sel is judicially acknowledged. If nothing else, that would send a signal
to the growing battalions of legal Rambos that the courts will no longer
acquiesce in their style. In any event, the Horn rule-that outrageous
misconduct of counsel, even if prejudicial, is not even entitled to consid-
eration on appeal unless the victim first goes through the ineffective cere-
mony of objecting, assigning the misconduct as misconduct, and
requesting a jury admonition-10 -- should be recognized for what it is: an
101. 61 Cal. 2d 602, 394 P.2d 561, 39 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 909
(1965).
102. 70 Cal. 2d 311, 449 P.2d 750, 74 Cal. Rptr. 534, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
103. After all, it is a California maxim of jurisprudence that he who takes the benefit must
bear the burden. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3521 (West 1970 & Supp. 1991).
104. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
105. Id. at 22-24.
106. Horn, 61 Cal. 2d at 610, 394 P.2d at 565, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 725. This is reminiscent of
the discarded practice of lawyers having to take exception to trial courts' rulings or be deemed
to have waived their points. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 647 (West 1976 & Supp.
1991) (party need only object and "all other orders, rulings, actions or decisions are deemed to
have been excepted to") with ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 77-78
(1970) ("Ordinarily a litigant must alert the trial court to the error and set forth the grounds of
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embarrassment to California's judiciary. It warrants a swift trip to the
legal trash heap for recycling into something, anything, better."°7 There
is something undeniably shocking about a rule of law that recognizes the
occurrence of serious and prejudicial wrongdoing, imposes no curative or
even ameliorative duties on the wrongdoer, but does impose them-with
a vengeance-on the victim. There has got to be something terribly
wrong with that.
Judicial concerns about differentiating between lawyers' conduct
and clients' interest should not be ignored. To begin with, the barrier to
courts acting in this area, established by Bauguess v. Paine,10 has been
breached by section 575.2(b) of the California Civil Procedure Code
which expresses a legislative intent that any sanctions imposed in the
context of failure to comply with local court rules be imposed on the
lawyer, and not adversely affect the rights of the client."19 Cases apply-
ing this section make it clear that the interests of the misbehaving lawyer
and the innocent client can be judicially separated, while still making the
lawyers toe the line. I" While this statute is limited to violations of local
court rules, there is no reason why courts cannot take the legislative pol-
icy determination that a client should not suffer for a lawyer's transgres-
sions"' as a basis for fashioning decisional rules accordingly.112 But in
any event, a moral judgment has to be made somewhere, and if it comes
down to a contest between John Rambo on one side, and Atticus
Finch ' 13 on the other, it is absurd to suggest that the former is free to
march into morally uninhibited litigational battle by driving his client
ahead of him as a shield, while the latter (and his client) must just stand
his objection."). It is mystifying why, in the area of misconduct of counsel, modem courts
should cling to such an archaic procedure, particularly in a way that favors immoral behavior
of unscrupulous lawyers.
107. See Horn, 61 Cal. 2d at 610, 394 P.2d at 565, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 725. This harsh assess-
ment is justified by the cases discussed ante, which demonstrate that the vaunted "admoni-
tion"-far from possessing the talismanic powers attributed to it by the reviewing courts-is
far too often either de facto not available at all, or where available is ineffective as a cure.
108. 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978) (superseded by CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991)).
109. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575.2(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
110. See Cooks v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 723, 726, 274 Cal. Rptr. 113, 115
(1990); State ex rel. Public Works Bd. v. Bragg, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1024, 228 Cal. Rptr.
576, 580 (1986).
111. See Bragg, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1026, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
112. See Roger I. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 43 CAL. ST. B.J. 509
(1968).
113. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (dignified fictional lawyer who stood
down lynch mob).
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there and take it. That is neither good law nor good ethics. Nor is it
efficient in the long run, as we are learning.
The idea of efficiency that is supposed to flow from avoidance of
retrials must also be considered." 4 Considerations of efficiency must
take into account the proliferation of litigation inspired by "Rambo-
style" tactics and the widely held belief that one does not have to follow
the rules to prevail. Indeed, shifting the cost of misconduct onto the
lawyers prone to engage in it would likely turn the concept of efficiency
to constructive use by providing economic disincentives for improper be-
havior. Moreover, there are bigger fish frying here. In a society that was
first persuaded to embrace governance by a principled "rule of law" as its
salvation, and is now increasingly told that the law is too busy to act in
accordance with elemental decency, this adds to accumulating social dy-
namite. 11 The public is growing disenchanted with the operation of the
114. If efficiency is all that important, we should perhaps take Ambrose Bierce at his word,
and consider replacing the appellate process with an impeccably honest roll of the dice. AM-
BROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 17 (1911) (defining "appeal" as "to put the dice
into the box for another throw"). At least in some areas of the law that might even be an
improvement. See supra note 94.
115. I am not so naive as to envision a popular political revolt inspired by too many
"Rambo-style" lawyers running loose in the courthouse. My concerns center on the fact that
perceptions and ideas not only have consequences, but also synergistic and unanticipated ef-
fects. It is not all that difficult to envision a popular politician taking to the stump and fortify-
ing his or her election chances with an occasional bit of public handwringing that it is getting
so that an honest person cannot get a fair hearing in our courts, while convicted murderers get
dozens. Need I go on?
We may have put too many eggs into our legal basket. The courts have taken on too
much, and the people have been conditioned to expect too much from them. The debate about
the courts, their composition, functioning, and proper role has grown shrill, with no abatement
of intensity in sight. The same is true of the intramural tensions among judges, particularly as
highlighted by the increasingly sharp tone of majority and dissenting opinions. See Interim
Report, supra note 2, at 39-40 (major source of discord among judges is "unnecessary lectur-
ing" and "personal criticism" of trial judges by circuit judges who sometimes "fail[ ] to recog-
nize that professionals may disagree without sarcasm"); Gilbert, supra note 2 (discussing
incivility among judges).
The operation of the criminal courts on the edge of collapse in the large drug-infested
cities, and the incidence of violent crime with the law's all too evident inability to control it,
are also factors with an unknown but indisputably corrosive effect. How these factors will
combine with other public concerns about the law, and other concerns (such as, for example, a
truly serious economic downturn), or what political forces may emerge to capitalize on such
concerns, are things not known to me.
But all that certainly should inspire some hard, and hard-headed, thinking about the law's
future. It should also inspire within the legal profession a healthy concern about husbanding
its shrinking public goodwill. The profession is increasingly viewed as parasitic and dragging
down American productiveness, competitiveness and efficiency, and at worst as a bunch of
unprincipled shysters eager to lay off any misfortune on the nearest solvent bystander. See
Julie Johnson & Ratu Kamlani, Do We Have Too Many Lawyers?, TIME, Aug. 26, 1991, at 54;
Michael Kinsley, TRAB From Washington: Quayle's Case, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1991, at 4,
RAMBO LITIGATION
legal system as it is. The spreading perception of "the law" as crudely
rapacious or an instrument of ideology, rather than the vaunted "search
for truth" in the cause of neutral dispute resolution, is not likely to do the
beleaguered courts any good, to say nothing of the legal profession.
Thus, any accounting of costs must include the demoralization costs suf-
fered when judicial institutions ostensibly dedicated to fairness actually
operate with crude unfairness.
In the meantime, what is happening in the courts is the ongoing
operation of a variant of Gresham's law." 6 When lawyers' misconduct
exacts no meaningful disincentives and indeed enjoys the same currency
in the courtroom as ethical behavior, we should not act surprised when
by degrees the former replaces the latter, and deception, intimidation and
nastiness become the de facto behavioral standards of the mainstream of
a once great profession. "The fact that 'Rambo' lawyers get results, no
matter what the personal cost in lawyer relations, begets more 'Rambos'
as client expectations and loyalties change."'
' 17
4. Even if reality does not justify these perceptions, I demur. In politics, public perceptions
are the ultimate reality.
116. Gresham's law is a law of economics which holds that where intrinsically valuable and
base currencies receive the same acceptance, the bad currency displaces the good. 5 NEw
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITrANICA 489 (15th ed. 1988).
117. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 13.
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